Security Operations Guide

Summary¶

After reading this guide, the defence analyst or municipal security procurement officer can assess libdrone's IFF and operational security architecture, select the appropriate platform variant for their deployment context, and understand what training and discipline is required to operate the platform in security- sensitive environments. Learning objective: produce a platform selection recommendation with a supporting rationale.

Concept¶

The civilian operator's IFF position¶

Civilian operators in security-relevant environments are not equipped with classified military IFF. They do not have access to NATO Mode 4/5 transponders. They are, nonetheless, operating in environments where being identified as friendly — by allied observers, by security forces, by community groups managing a shared operating picture — is a meaningful safety requirement.

→ threat-assessment frames the problem precisely: the goal is not to identify hostile drones. The goal is to remove libdrone platforms from the ambiguous population — to make them positively identifiable to allied observers so that the cognitive load of "is that ours?" is reduced to zero for any observer with the right equipment.

→ iff-architecture maps the five-layer implementation from IR strobe (L1) through ATAK CoT integration (L3/L4) to the reserved future allied IFF interface (L6). Every layer adds coverage in the scenario where the layer above it fails.

Platform selection for security context¶

→ platform-selection is the decision matrix. The short version:

For ATAK-integrated operations with mission state visibility: Bandit (ArduPilot, MAVLink native, full ATAK integration). The Bandit's ArduPilot firmware streams HEARTBEAT, GPS, and ATTITUDE via MAVLink to the ESP32-S3 bridge, which relays CoT to the tactical network.

For manually-piloted payload operations with position-only ATAK presence: Pro (Betaflight, MSP→CoT bridge, position and battery state visible in ATAK). Not mission state, but adequate for situational awareness.

For reduced-emissions operations where visual and RF signature is a priority: Ghost (standard EMCON reduced configuration, VTX at 25 mW or off, ELRS at minimum power).

Operating the IFF stack¶

→ iff-layers is the operational quick reference: what each layer provides, what equipment observers need to benefit from it, and what the operator must do to maintain it. The IR strobe summary: fits in a vest pocket, costs €10, works when everything else fails, requires no configuration.

The ATAK CoT configuration is in → iff-architecture. The ESP32-S3 companion board architecture — three concurrent firmware tasks (MAVLink→CoT bridge, Remote ID broadcast, IFF GPIO interface) and EMCON kill switch — is in → esp32-s3-companion. The firmware update, TAK server configuration, and verification procedure are all covered. Once configured, the blue rotary-wing icon appears on ATAK automatically when the drone has a GPS fix.

Emissions control decisions¶

→ operational-security is the EMCON reference. Before each deployment in a security-sensitive context, the operator should answer four questions:

What am I broadcasting and to whom?
Does Remote ID broadcasting create an operator position disclosure risk in this context?
Which EMCON level (standard / reduced / minimum) matches this environment?
If EMCON minimum, what IFF capability remains? (Answer: IR strobe only.)

→ emissions-control covers the platform-level controls: VTX power reduction or disable, ELRS dynamic power minimum, ESP32-S3 WiFi hotspot disable, CoT output to authenticated TAK only.

Training requirements¶

This guide is not a training programme — it is an operational reference. The training programme is → sk-bandit-awareness-curriculum: Part A covers the threat landscape and IFF theory, Part B covers the practical exercises (visual identification, night ops with IR strobe, ATAK integration, emissions awareness demonstration).

A security operator who has not completed the awareness curriculum should not be operating with IFF-configured hardware in a security-sensitive context. The hardware capability is meaningless without the operational discipline to use it correctly — particularly the EMCON discipline of knowing when to go silent and what that costs.

Reference¶

Decision summary by scenario¶

Scenario	Platform	IFF layers active	EMCON
Community preparedness, civilian	Pro	L1 + L2 + L4 (if ATAK available)	Standard
Municipal emergency response	Pro or Bandit	L1 + L2 + L3/L4	Standard
Night security watch	Ghost	L1 (IR strobe) + optional L3/L4	Reduced
ATAK-integrated coordination	Bandit	L1 + L2 + L3	Standard or Reduced
High-risk contested environment	Ghost	L1 only (IR strobe)	Minimum

Procedure¶

Pre-deployment IFF checklist¶

IR strobe fitted, battery charged, operating pattern confirmed
Remote ID module active and broadcasting correct e-ID (or operational decision to suspend — documented)
If CoT active: TAK server accessible, callsign configured, blue icon visible on test tablet before departure
EMCON level determined and documented in mission plan
All team members briefed on the drone's IR strobe pattern and the EMCON level for this operation

Rationale¶

The defence analyst persona traversal (threat-assessment → iff-architecture → operational-security → platform-selection) exists because the technical atoms in these domains require a connecting narrative for a reader who is evaluating the platform from a security procurement perspective rather than a technical building perspective. This skeleton provides that narrative and the decision sequence — the atoms provide the technical depth.